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Transfer Pricing and FIN 48: Removing
Uncertainty Through The Advanced
Pricing Agreement Process

Christopher Capuzzi
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing globalization of companies is indisputable, and the
multinational enterprise offers many heuristic challenges.' Among these
are jurisdiction-specific taxation and accounting standards and principles.
Enterprises often operate without regard to legal entity structures but rather
along business lines.2 While entities may operate without regard to
jurisdictional lines, local taxing and accounting regimes are steadfast on
ensuring adherence to their respective principles. Chief among these is
ensuring that there is a proper allocation of the tax base. The proper
allocation of the tax base has long been at the forefront of concerns, so
much so that normative transfer pricing principles have existed for decades.
However, the "variation in tax rules across national tax jurisdictions causes
different degrees of complexity and uncertaint7 for both the tax authority
and the taxpayer regarding tax base allocation."
Pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline PLC's $3.4 billion 2006
settlement with the United States Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.)
demonstrates the importance of the proper allocation of the corporate tax
base. The settlement was the largest in the I.R.S.'s history and resolved a
nearly two-decade long transfer pricing dispute between the I.R.S. and
Glaxo's American subsidiary in its dealings with the British parent
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1E.g., Paul Hannon, World Factory Output Falls, Clouding Recovery, WALL ST. J., Aug.
10, 2004, at A2 (discussing that widespread industrial output decreases in 2004 suggest that
"globalization is increasing the degree of synchronization in the world economy. . .").
2 Markus Brem & Thomas Tucha, Globalization, Multinationals, and Tax Base
Allocation: Advance Pricing Agreements as Shifts in International Taxation?, in
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION HANDBOOK: POLICY, PRACTICE, STANDARDS, AND REGULATION
114 (Colin Read & Greg Gregoriou eds., 2007).
3 Id.

721

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

30:721 (2010)

4

company.
Moreover, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is
working with the chief accounting standard setter in the United States, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), to converge U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles and International Accounting Standards.
Nonetheless, the FASB's Interpretation Number (FIN) 48 is wholly
inapposite to principles based accounting. This provision concerns the
recordation and measurement of an entity's uncertain tax positions and
creates unique challenges for entities that must deal with transfer pricing.
The purpose of this Comment is to propose a process whereby the
taxpayer or financial statement preparer can minimize uncertainty in
preparing its FIN 48 analysis for transfer pricing positions through the
I.R.S. Advanced Pricing Agreement process.
At present, divergent
doctrines and standards set forth by the I.R.S. and the FASB create
complexity and inefficiency for the taxpayer or financial statement preparer.
Part II examines the definition and historical underpinnings of transfer
pricing and also illustrates the operation of transfer pricing. Part III looks
beyond the United States and covers methodologies employed among
foreign jurisdictions in carrying out transfer pricing systems. Part IV
analyzes the complexities that are inherent in transfer pricing as well as
programs that have been implemented to mitigate these intricacies. Part V
introduces FIN 48 and its application to financial statement preparers. Part
VI examines FIN 48's impact on transfer pricing and the addition of yet
another nuance to the transfer pricing puzzle. In Part VII a new proposal is
introduced in an attempt to harmonize FIN 48 and transfer pricing.
II. TRANSFER PRICING: DEFINITION AND HISTORY
In a broad sense, "transfer pricing refers to the pricing of goods,
services, capital and technology inputs, managerial skills, financial services,
shared/support services, etc. if they are transferred between affiliates of [a
It includes the prices a multi-national
multi-national enterprise]." 6
enterprise charges its affiliated entities for goods or services that are
Corporations often operate without
transferred within the enterprise.
4 Robert Guy Matthews & Jeanne Whalen, Glaxo to Settle Tax Dispute with IRS Over
U.S. Unitfor $3.4 Billion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2006, at A3.
s News Release, Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB and IASB Agree to Work
Together Toward Convergence of Global Accounting Standards (Oct. 29, 2002),
http://www.fasb.org/news/nrl02902.shtml.
6

Brem & Tucha, supra note 2, at 115.

See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSFER
II
PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS,
(hereinafter OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES); Barry Freeman, Recent Developments
in Transfer PricingCreate Uncertaintyfor MultinationalCorporations,15-4 METRO. CORP.
COUNSEL 30 (2007) ("Transfer pricing is the area of tax law that deals with the allocation of
income resulting from transactions between commonly controlled parties."); J. Scott Wilkie,
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regard to jurisdictional boundaries and shift goods, services, knowledge,
and other tangible and intangible assets from one part of the organization to
another. At first glance, such a distribution scheme may simply seem to be
the result of economic principles and an efficient use of resources. But
lurking behind the scenes, tax arbitrage opportunities often pervade such
transactions.
An example from Eduardo Baistrocchi's A Global Proposal for
Simplification provides a simple illustration of how and why such a
transaction takes place.8 Assume that X is a manufacturer of cars and a
resident of France. X Sub is its wholly-owned subsidiary resident in Great
Britain, which resells the cars to independent customers in that country.
The taxable income of the subsidiary is determined by three variables: (1)
the reselling price of the cars to independent customers, (2) the expenses
paid for all its inputs (except for the cars), and (3) the expenses incurred for
purchasing the cars from the manufacturer.9 The market generally
determines the first two variables. Conversely, the third variable is entirely
under the manufacturer's control. Therefore, if the tax rate of the
manufacturer's jurisdiction, France, is higher than that of its subsidiary,
Great Britain, the manufacturer can charge the lowest possible transfer price
to its subsidiary in order to channel the profits of the multinational
enterprise to the subsidiary's jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the tax rate
applicable to the manufacturer is lower than that of its subsidiary, the
manufacturer can charge the highest possible price to its subsidiary. The
net effect of this transfer pricing strategy is to increase the global after-tax
return of the multinational enterprise by shifting the profits to the most
favorable tax jurisdiction.
Transfer pricing rules seek to normalize the effects of a commonly
controlled enterprise's tax manipulation and place it on parity with the
income that would have been earned had the company been operating as a
true stand-alone entity and not part of a controlled group. To that end,
countries worldwide are concerned that they are receiving an equitable
share of a controlled entity's tax base and impose significant penalties on
transfer pricing adjustments.' 0
Internal Revenue Code Section 48211 permits the I.R.S. to allocate
Donald Wilson, William D. Rohrer, & Matthew T. Staab, InternationalTaxation, 41 INT'L
LAW. 581 (2007) ("Transfer pricing concerns the measurement and allocation of
international income within a commonly controlled corporate group among group members
who make functional contributions to the earning of that income and have undertaken risks
with respect to how that income is earned.")
8 Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Global Proposal for
Simplification, 59 TAx LAW. 941, 949-50 (2006).
9 Id. at 949-50.
10Wilkie et al., supra note 7, at 586.
'1 I.R.C. § 482 (2000):
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
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gross income, deductions, and credits between related taxpayers to the
extent necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or to reflect clearly the income
of related taxpayers. Section 482 serves two functions. First, it prevents a
shifting of income to more tax favorable jurisdictions. Second, in the
international setting, even if the intercompany transactions did not result in
an overall reduction in the tax burden of the controlled group, the I.R.S. can
invoke Section 482 to allocate income to the United States to ensure its
appropriate share of tax revenue. 12
The power of the I.R.S. to allocate income is not a new concept. As
far back as 1917, the Commissioner was authorized to allocate income and
deductions among affiliated corporations.13 The Revenue Act of 1921
contained the first version of what has become section 482.14 In the 1928
Act, the Commissioner's authority was significantly expanded and was
"expressly predicated upon his duty to prevent tax avoidance and to ensure
the clear reflection of the income of the related parties." 5
For decades, the small number of multi-national enterprises meant that
section 482 and its predecessors had little impact in the international
taxation arena.16 Regulations that were first issued in 1935 remained
largely unchanged until 1968.17 The regulations promulgated that an arm's
length standard be applied in determining true taxable income. 18 However,
these regulations did not mandate a particular allocation of income method
with the result that the predecessors of the current section 482 were used
broadly to challenge a variety of tax avoidance schemes. 9 With no clear
directive, the courts applied a number of different standards to determine if

incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or
businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation
is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income
of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or
license) of intangible property (within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B) [26
USCS § 936(h)(3)(B)]), the income with respect to such transfer or license shall
be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.
12 PAUL R. MCDANIEL, HUGH J. AULT, & JAMES R. REPETTI, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED
STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 146 (5th ed., 2005).
13 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REGULATIONS No. 41 RELATIVE TO THE WAR EXCESS
PROFITS TAX, IMPOSED BY THE WAR REVENUE ACT, APPROVED OCTOBER 3, 1917 arts. 77-78
(1918).
14 I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B.459 (hereinafter the "White Paper").

1 Id.
16 Id.
17
1s
'9
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a transaction was conducted at arm's length.20
Beginning in the 1960s, Congress became aware of the increasing
problem of U.S. companies shifting their U.S. income to more tax
advantageous foreign jurisdictions. 2 1 In 1988 the Internal Revenue Service
prepared the "White Paper," a comprehensive study of intercompany
pricing rules.22 The 1988 I.R.S. study "was followed by proposed and
temporary regulations in 1992 and 1993 ... [with] [flinal regulations ...
issued in 1994..... 23 Only minor modifications to the regulations have
been made since the 1994 final regulations were enacted.24 The regulations,
as enacted, again confirmed the arm's length standard but also went a step
further and established specific rules for certain kinds of intercompany
transactions, including the performance of services, loans, and sales of
25
tangible and intangible property.
Broadly speaking, the arm's length standard is the amount charged or
which would have been charged for the same or similar transaction had the
transaction been executed between unrelated parties under similar
circumstances considering all relevant facts. 26 "The regulations provide
specific methods to be used to determine whether transactions between
related parties conform to the arm's length standard." 27 The taxpayer is
instructed to use the "best method" in determining which method to use to
apply the arm's length standard. Specifically, "[t]he arm's length result of
[a] controlled transaction must be determined under the method that under
the facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm's
length result." 28 Furthermore, "in determining which of two or more
available methods (or applications of a single method) provides the most
reliable measure of an arm's length result, the two primary factors to take
into account are the degree of comparability between the controlled
transaction (or taxpayer) and any uncontrolled comparables, and the quality
of the data and assumptions used in the analysis."29 For example, the
regulations regarding the sale of tangible personal property set out five
specific methods for determining an appropriate arm's length price. The
five methods are the comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price
method, cost plus method, the comparable profits method, and the profit
20
21
22

Id. at 460.
See Id.
Id.

23 McDANIEL ET AL., supra note

12, at 145.
id.
25 Notice 88-123, supra note
14.
26 See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (2008) (describing the arm's length
standard as
applied to transactions involving services, the sale or licensing of intangible property, and
the sale of tangible personal property).
24

27 McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 12, 147.
28
29

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (2008).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2) (2008).
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split method.30 There is also an unspecified sixth method which can be
used if "it provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result
under the principles of the best method rule."3
Initially there was confusion as to whether or not the I.R.S. could use
section 482 simply to allocate income or if they could use it to create
income. 32 B. Forman Co. v. Comm'r and its progeny in other circuits
clearly established that the I.R.S. could in fact use section 482 to create
income. 33 In Forman, the taxpayer argued that the Commissioner may not
create income where none actually existed, and cited case law holding to
that effect.34 The IRS successfully imposed an arm's length interest rate on
an interest free loan between two controlled entities on the grounds that no
unrelated parties would loan such large sums without interest and that to not
impute interest would seriously impair the usefulness of section 482.
This imputed interest rate resulted in the creation of interest income to the
lender. Although Forman occurred before the enactment of section 7872,
which would now likely control such a transaction, the case still stands for
the proposition that the I.R.S. may use section 482 to create income and not
simply reallocate it.37
The Commissioner must take into account collateral adjustments under
section 482.
Collateral adjustments may include correlative allocations,
conforming adjustments, and setoffs.39 Correlative adjustments involve the
corresponding decrease in a member of the controlled group's income when
an increase has been made to another member of the group. Conforming
adjustments are those that "must be made to conform a taxpayer's accounts
to reflect allocations made under section

4 82

."40 For example, the creation

or attribution of additional income could lead to the creation of an account
receivable debit entry on the balance sheet. "If an allocation is made under
section 482 with respect to a transaction between controlled taxpayers, the
Commissioner will take into account the effect of any other non-arm's
length transaction between the same controlled taxpayers in the same
taxable year which will result in a setoff against the original section 482
30Treas. Reg.
31Treas. Reg.

§§ 1.482-3(a)(1)-(5) (2008).
§ 1.482-3(e)(1) (2008).

32MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note at 12, at 147.
3 B. Forman Co. v. Comm'r, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Central De Gas de
Chihauaha v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 515 (1994) (imputing rent on equipment used where no rent
had been charged).
34 Forman, 453 F.2d at 1156.
35 id.

36Id. at
subsidiary).
3 I.R.C.
38 Treas.
39 Id.
40 Treas.
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allocation."'
III. TRANSFER PRICING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
As mentioned above, transfer pricing is not solely of domestic
concern, but rather is an increasingly pervasive issue among many foreign
taxing authorities who, like the United States, are concerned about the
erosion of their tax bases.The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development's Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD
Model Tax Convention) forms the basis for extensive bilateral income tax
treaties between OECD member countries and OECD member and nonmember countries.42 The OECD Model Tax Convention addresses the issue
of transfer pricing in Article 9 and it too endorses an arm's length
standard.43 The OECD originally published Transfer Pricing Guidelines in
1979 and in 1995 it revised the guidelines. The OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines are commonly adopted in some manner by OECD member
countries in their domestic tax legislation and practices.4
Many U.S. income tax treaties have provisions that allow the United
States to determine the income of persons that are subject to the United
State's taxing authority. Like section 482, most of these treaties contain the
arm's length standard. "Under recent treaties, where a reallocation of
income has been made by one country, the other country agrees to make
corresponding adjustments to the extent that it agrees with the [United
State's] redetermination of income. To the extent that the other country
does not agree with the redetermination, the two countries endeavor to
reach a compromise under the general mutual agreement procedures
contained in the treaty."A If no compromise is reached, the taxpayer is
faced with double taxation at the international level. In order for a U.S.
taxpayer to claim the foreign tax credit on an item of income that was
reallocated from a foreign taxing jurisdiction to the United States and in
which they did not receive a correlative adjustment, the U.S. taxpayer must
face an onerous task. The taxpayer must establish that it "has exhausted its
administrative remedies under foreign law in seeking a refund of the foreign
41 Treas Reg.

§ 1.482-lT(g)(4)(i) (2008).
42 OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 7,

1 8;

see also Baistrocchi, supra

note 8, at 933 ("The OECD Model is the foundation for a network of over 2,500 bilateral tax
treaties").
43 Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides:
[When] conditions are made or imposed between .. . two [associated] enterprises
in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would
be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for
those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise
and taxed accordingly.
4 Wilkie et al., supra note 7, at 586.
45 McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 12, at 156.
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taxes paid on the income so reallocated."4 6
Although the application of the arm's length principle to controlledentity transactions faces criticism, many of the OECD members widely
agree that it should govern the transactions. The reason for such approval is
that it provides parity for transactions entered into by both controlled
enterprises as well as independent entities. 4 7 Furthermore, the arm's length
standard most closely approximates the workings of the open market in
situations where goods and services are transferred between related parties
and sets the normal operation of the market as the benchmark.48
The criticism of the arm's length principle is certainly worth noting.
Because associated enterprises often engage in transactions that
independent enterprises may not engage in, such as the sale of intangibles
like intellectual property, it is often practically difficult to apply the arm's
length principle to such a transaction. 49 The taxing authority also faces
administrative burdens in the application of the arm's length principle. The
taxpayer generally establishes the conditions for a transaction at the time it
is entered into; however, the taxpayer may be required at some point in the
future, often several years later, to demonstrate that the transaction is
consistent with the arm's length principle.
Additionally, the taxing authority must not only gather information
from the taxpayer, but also gather information about the market at the time
of the transaction and information about similar transactions several years
after the transaction took place, thus creating an enormous informationgathering burden.50 Aside from the temporal complexities, the taxing
authority and taxpayer often have a difficult time obtaining documentation
to support the arm's length standard because the documentation may not
exist, the documentation of transactions among independent entities may be
unavailable due to confidentiality concerns, the available case law may be
too fact specific to allow a taxpayer to make a reasonable prediction as to a
future court's determination of whether an arm's length transaction took
place, and countless other issues."
The OECD Model of transfer pricing is principles-based, requiring an
functional
ex post analysis and a reliance on developed case law or the
52
equivalent thereof to determine the appropriate transfer prices. Indeed the
arm's length standard is inherently principles based, unlike other
mechanisms, such as the Global Formulary Apportionment Method, which
has been suggested but has not displaced the widely accepted arm's length
46

Id. at 157.

49

1 1.7.
Id. T 1.13; see also Baistrocchi, supra note 8, at 950.
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 7, 1.10.

5o

Id. 1 1.1 1.

47 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 7,
4s

51
52
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standard. 5 3 Due to the lack of good case law and general political
instability, enforcement problems and unpredictability abound in many
developing countries which have imported a derivative of the OECD Model
and the arm's length standard.5 4 The lack of good case law and precedent
means that the developing countries' standard based norms, such as the
arm's length standard, remain unknowable to taxpayers.
IV. UNCERTAINTIES IN TRANSFER PRICING
The OECD has recognized the inherent complexity of transfer pricing
and the potential for both the taxpayer and the taxing authority to draw the
wrong conclusions from the facts presented. The OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines ("OECD Guidelines") encourage the tax examiners in those
countries which choose to adopt the OECD guidelines not to demand that
the taxpayer be precise in situations where it is unrealistic to do so and also
that the tax examiner be flexible in his approach. The OECD Guidelines
suggest that the tax examiner take the taxpayer's commercial judgment into
account about the application of the arm's length standard to ensure "that
the transfer pricing is tied to business realities" rather than academic
norms.57
In connection with the 1988 "White Paper" and through efforts of the
Treasury, Chief Counsel, and International Examination personnel, a
questionnaire was prepared and sent to selected International Examiners
asking them to identify the difficulties theXy were encountering in
One of the principal
administering the transfer pricing regulations.
concerns in the administration of section 482 had been and continues to be
the difficulty in obtaining pricing information from the taxpayers during an
examination. 59 In most cases the I.R.S. is either not furnished relevant
information from the taxpayer or the I.R.S. encounters significant delays in
receiving it. The problem is not necessarily one of the taxpayer's refusal to
furnish relevant information to the I.R.S. but rather the confusion regarding
what documentation needs to be retained to support transfer pricing
conclusions.
There has been an emergence of national documentation requirements
implemented by many national tax authorities to enforce the internationally

s See id. at 949 (stating that the arm's length standard enjoys a fairly wide international
consensus and is backed by the OECD versus the Global Formulary Apportionment).
54 Id. at 945 (stating that Argentina's entire Supreme court has been replaced en masse
five times since 1947 leading to sudden changes in the Argentine transfer pricing case law).
ss Id. at 954.
56OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 7, 4.9.

57 Id.
5 Notice 88-123, supra note 14.

59 Id.
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accepted arm's length pricing principle. 6 0 This has not, however, relieved
all confusion. Specifically, the existence of intra-company transactions
associated with intangible trade often leaves both the taxpayer and the
taxing authority puzzled with respect to the appropriate pricing of the
individual transaction. To further complicate matters, different countries
have different rules regarding what transactions need to be priced and
consequently measured under the arm's length standard. This disparity in
defining the transactions that are subject to the standard therefore leaves
almost all taxpayers in an unpredictable state of limbo.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, even where transactions would be
subject to transfer pricing regimes, often the lack of case law and directives
on the application of the arm's length standard often leave the taxpayer
unsure whether the transaction will pass the proverbial muster of the taxing
authority.
The proliferation of Advanced Pricing Agreement ("APA") programs
demonstrates the concern that multinational organizations have for avoiding
double taxation, reducing the potential transfer pricing complexities, and
the desire of the jurisdiction to resolve potential disputes ex-ante. There are
at least 34 countries that have established APA programs.61 An APA is an
arrangement between the taxpayer and the taxing authority, generally in
advance of controlled related-party transactions, wherein a set of criteria for
the determination of transfer pricing over a fixed period of time is agreed
upon.62 In the case of the I.R.S. APA Program, the APA is an agreement
between the I.R.S. and the taxpayer in which the parties set forth the
specific transfer pricing method to use for the calculation and allocation of
taxable income arising from specified transactions. 63 "APAs are intended to
supplement the traditional administrative, judicial, and treaty mechanisms
for resolving transfer pricing issues."6 APAs often contain the method that
will be used to compute the arm's length prices, the possible comparables
that will be used in determining what an appropriate arm's length price
would be, the assumptions underlying what transactions will be used in
defining the tax base, and so on.
An APA is analogous to a contract between the taxpayer and the
taxing authority whereby certain assumptions, principles, methods, and
other taxing inputs are determined in advance and to which the taxpayer is
to comply in the calculation of taxable income. The I.R.S. agrees not to
seek a section 482 adjustment for a covered transaction if the taxpayer files
its return for the covered year in accordance with the agreed transfer pricing
Brem & Tucha, supra note 2, at 115.
Steven C. Wrappe & David J. Canale, Advance PricingAgreements - A Strategic Tool
in Global TransferPricing,60 TAX EXEC. 193, 193 (2008).
62Brem & Tucha, supra note 2, at 117.
63 Wrappe & Canale, supra note 61, at 193.
6 Brem & Tucha, supra note 2, at 118.
6o
61
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method contained in the APA.
There are three kinds of APAs: unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral.
Unilateral APAs refer to those APAs that are between the taxpayer and the
taxing authority in a single jurisdiction. Bilateral APAs govern the
relationship between the taxpayer and two taxing jurisdictions. And multilateral APAs refer to APAs in which the taxpayer and more than two taxing
authorities are parties to the APA. Accordingly, a unilateral APA provides
no protection against the possibility of a foreign jurisdiction-initiated
transfer pricing adjustment.
Even more, the unilateral APA will likely
affect the tax liability in another country due to the change computed for
arm's length prices at the taxing authority level in which the APA was
initiated. Non-participating countries may not be amenable to the change in
the tax liability in their country and may therefore disallow the adjustment,
leading to potential double taxation. Because of the double taxation
problems that can arise in securing a unilateral APA, taxpayers should, and
indeed most taxing authorities participating in an APA program insist, that
the taxpayer seek a bilateral or multilateral APA.67
The idea that APAs are meant to be non-adversarial lends further
credence to the theory that an APA is similar to a contract. It is not a onesided determination by the taxing authority, but rather an interactive process
between the taxing authority or authorities, whichever the case may be, and
the taxpayer whereby they attempt to solve some of the potential transfer
pricing disputes ex ante as opposed to ex post. Additionally, the taxpayer
saves time and costs by engaging in the transfer pricing negotiations at the
APA stage rather than attempting to later defend an examination.68
However, I.R.S. APAs have their limits in functionality. Generally, an
APA is reached only on the proposed covered transactions and in some
cases the APA Program may require that the scope of the covered
transactions either be expanded or contracted. 6 9 Additionally, the APA
Program may determine that a subset of the proposed covered transactions
should not be included in the proposed transfer pricing methodology.70
Furthermore, the taxpayer must provide data intended to show that the
transfer pricing methodology meets the "best method" rule under the
section 482 regulations." The filing of an APA request does not suspend
any examination or other enforcement proceedings; nevertheless, the APA
Program may coordinate with other I.R.S. activities to minimize the
65 I.R.S.

Announcement 2008-27, 2008-15 I.R.B. 751.
Wrappe & Canale, supra note 61, at 193.
67 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 7, % 4.120-131.
Wrappe & Canale, supra note 61, at 193.
69 Rev. Proc. 06-9, 2006-2 I.R.B. 278, § 2.04(3) (describing
the manner in which a
taxpayer may seek an Advance Pricing Agreement).
70

id.

7' Id. § 2.07.
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intrusiveness on the taxpayer, increase efficiency, and decrease repetitive
document requests.72
It is important to note however that the APA is just a guide and,
because it is determined ex ante, does not resolve whether or not the
taxpayer's computation of income will be accepted by the taxing authority.
Rather, the legal effect of the APA is to estop the I.R.S. from contesting the
application of the transfer pricing methodology to the subject matter of the
APA provided that the taxpayer complies with the terms and conditions set
forth in the APA."
In the countries where APA programs exist, APA programs are a form
of a cooperative agreement, and mark a shift from an adversarial,
bureaucratic taxation to a positive interaction between the taxpayer and the
-74
taxing authority.
V. FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48: ACCOUNTING FOR
UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES
Non-governmental issuers of financial statements in the United States
prepare their financial statements in accordance with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP")." The sources of U.S. GAAP are varied;
however, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), the
principal accounting standard-setter in the United States, promulgated a
GAAP Hierarchy in order to clarify the precedence of pronouncements in
76
the preparation of financial statements. The most authoritative sources of
GAAP are "FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards and
Interpretations, FASB Statement 133 Implementation Issues, FASB Staff
Positions, and American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA") Accounting Research Bulletins and Accounting Principles
Board Opinions that are not superseded by actions of the FASB."77
Within this most authoritative level, the FASB in 2006 issued FASB
Interpretation No. 48: Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, an
Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109 (FIN 48). The accounting for
taxes in general is governed by FASB Statement No. 109: Accounting for
Income Taxes (FAS 109). Although the validity of tax positions is a matter

72

Id. § 2.13.

Id. § 10.02.
Brem & Tucha, supra note 2, at 124-25.
71 See 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2008) ("Financial statements filed with the [SEC]
which are not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles will be
presumed to be misleading or inaccurate, despite footnote or other disclosures, unless the
[SEC] has otherwise provided.").
76 See generally Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 162: The Hierarchy of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(2008), availableat http://www.fasb.org/pdflaopFASl 62.pdf.
Id. T 3a.
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of tax law, the FASB recognized that the law is subject to various
interpretations and therefore the sustainability of a particular position taken
on a tax return is not always certain.
FAS 109 does not contain any
specific guidance on how to account for these uncertainties in positions
taken by a taxpayer.79 As a result, diverse practices developed among
taxpayers in accounting for such uncertainties. 0 These diverse practices led
to inconsistencies in the comparability of financial statements between
taxpayers as different criteria were being used by them to determine when
to recognize or derecognize such income tax position uncertainties as well
as how to measure and quantify the amount of uncertainty. 8' The FASB
therefore felt the need to address these diverse practices and in 2006 issued
FIN 48. FIN 48 defines criteria that an individual tax position must meet in
order for any portion of that position to be recognized in the financial
statements and then provides guidance on the measurement of such a
position.
Thus, FIN 48 contains a recognition mechanism and a
measurement mechanism. Furthermore, FIN 48 provides new disclosures
to which a filer must adhere.
1. Scope
FIN 48 applies to "all tax positions accounted for in accordance with
Statement 109.',82 A "tax position" refers to any position taken or expected
to be taken by a company in an already-filed tax return or a future tax return
that is reflected in measuring tax assets and liabilities in the financial
statements.83 The term "tax position" is broad. FIN 48 states that "tax
position[s] also [encompass], but [are] not limited to: (a) A decision not to
file a tax return, (b) An allocation or a shift of income between
jurisdictions, (c) The characterization of income or a decision to exclude
reporting taxable income in a tax return, (d) A decision to classify a
transaction, entity, or other position in a tax return as tax exempt."8 4 Thus
FIN 48 clearly applies to any shifts in income as a result of transfer pricing
adjustments.
2. Determining the Unit of Account
In order to determine what constitutes an individual tax position
requiring the FIN 48 analysis, the company must first determine the "unit of
78 Financial

Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48: Accounting for
Uncertainty in Income Taxes, an Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, 2 (2006),
availableat http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aopFIN48.pdf [hereinafter FIN 48].
79 Id.
s0 Id.
81 id.

82 Id. 3..
83 Id. t 4.

8 FIN 48, supra note 78,

14.
733

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

30:721 (2010)

account" at which they will examine tax positions. Factors of the unit of
account include the manner in which the enterprise prepares and supports
its income tax return and the approach the enterprise anticipates the taxing
The unit of account for
authority will take during an examination.
determining what constitutes a tax position is a matter ofjudgment.
Determining the unit of account is extremely important for the
company. The company will apply the standards set forth in FIN 48 to the
unit of account level in order to determine whether or not a tax position
may be recognized and if so, what portion of that benefit is to be
recognized. It is imperative that the organization understand the underlying
transactions which flow through to the financial statements as each
transaction may have "unique characteristics related to its transfer price,
which may affect the determination of the appropriate unit of account."8 6
Additionally the manner in which the local taxing authority may examine
Once the unit of
the transfer pricing could affect the unit of account.
account is determined, the unit of account should be consistently applied to
similar positions each period.88 A company may deviate from the
consistent application rule if the facts and circumstances indicate that a
different unit of account is more appropriate.89
3. Recognition and Measurement (Current and Subsequent)
After the company determines the unit of account level at which it will
examine its tax positions, the company must perform a two-step analysis to
determine the amount of the tax position that may be recorded in the
financial statements.
The first step of the analysis is the recognition test. This step is a
threshold step in which the company will only be able to record the effects
of tax positions when it is "more-likely-than-not" that the position, based on
its technical merits, will be sustained upon examination by the taxing
authority. 90 The "more-likely-than-not" standard is defined as a more than
fifty percent likelihood. 9 1 The organization must consider all the facts,
circumstances, and information available to it at the reporting date in
determining if the more-likely-than-not standard is met.92 If the position
does not pass the threshold "more-likely-than-not" standard, then no
amount of the position may be recognized in the financial statements.
85 Id.,

5.

86Amy Dunbar & Kathleen McEligot, Accounting for Income Taxes: Uncertain Tax

Positions (FIN 48), A-204 (BNA 5002 Accounting Policy & Practice Portfolio).
87 Id.

88 FIN 48, supranote 78,
89 id.

9 Id.? 6.
9' Id.
92
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FIN 48 includes several directives for assessing the more-likely-thannot threshold. There is a presumption that the tax position will be examined
by the relevant taxing authority having full knowledge of all relevant
information.93 Accordingly, a company cannot consider the probability that
the taxing authority will not examine the position. 94 Technical merits of a
tax position derive from sources of authorities in the tax law.95 However,
widely understood past practices and precedents of the taxing authority in
its dealings with the organization or similar oranizations can be taken into
account when assessing the technical merits.9 Each tax position is to be
evaluated without consideration of aggregation or offset with other
97
positions.
Once the company determines that the position is more-likely-than-not
to be sustained, the company must then determine the amount of the tax
position that may be recognized in the financial statements. This step is
aptly referred to as the "measurement" step. The position is "initially and
subsequently ... measured as the largest amount of tax benefit that is
greater than [fifty] percent likely of being realized upon settlement with a
taxing authority that has full knowledge of all relevant information." 98 This
step is arduous in that it requires a company to examine the outcomes and
probabilities that could be realized upon settlement. While a probability
table is not mandated, "it helps a company focus on the possible
outcomes." 99 The use of probabilities for tax position measurement
purposes is a novel concept for tax practitioners and the determination of
each possible outcome requires significant judgment on the tax preparer's
part. 00 The company records a FIN 48 liability for the amount of the tax

position that does not survive the two-step process. 01
FIN 48 not only requires a significant amount of work in order to
determine the initial recognition and measurement of the tax position but
also requires a continual monitoring of all tax positions. A taxpayer shall
recognize the benefit of a tax position in the first period that the position
meets any of the following conditions: "(a) the more-likely-than-not
recognition threshold is met by the reporting date, (b) the tax position is
effectively settled through examination, negotiation, or litigation, (c) the
statute of limitations for the relevant taxing authority to examine and

9 Id. 1 7.
94 FIN 48, supra note 78, 1 Bl9.
95 Id.
96 id.
9 Id.
98 Id. T 8.
9 Dunbar & McEligot, supra note 86, at A-402.
'0 Id. at A-402-03.
101Id.
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challenge the tax position has expired."l 0 2 In determining effective
settlement, the FASB directs the taxpayer to evaluate whether the taxing
authority has completed its examination procedures, whether the taxpayer
intends to appeal or litigate any aspect of the tax position, or if it is remote
that the taxing authority would examine or reexamine any aspect of the tax
position. 0 3 The taxpayer is instructed to assume that the taxing authority
has full knowledge of all relevant information and, in light of this
knowledge, the taxing authority's policy on reopening closed examinations
combined with the facts and circumstances of the tax position.' 04 Effective
settlement must be considered on a position by position basis. 0 5 Perhaps
more intrusive is the fact that an organization must continue to monitor
positions that it considers to be effectively settled. The reason for this
continual monitoring is that in the event the organization becomes aware
that the taxing authority may examine or reexamine the tax position or
intends to litigate an aspect of it, the position is no longer considered
effectively settled. 06
Conversely, a company is required to derecognize a previously
recognized tax position when the position no longer meets the more-likelythan-not threshold. 0 7 Furthermore, changes in judgment that lead to
subsequent recognition, derecognition, or measurement should result from
the company's evaluation of new information and not from a new
evaluation or internretation of information that was available in a previous
reporting period.'o
4. Classification and Disclosures
The new pronouncements require that an entity whose tax positions
necessitate FIN 48 adjustments report a liability for the difference between
the amount of the position and the amount that survives the FIN 48
analysis. Accordingly, these differences are called "unrecognized tax
benefits" as they are tax positions taken by the organization which cannot
be recognized for financial statement purposes.' 09 The unrecognized tax
benefits are classified as a liability which shall not be combined with other
deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities."o
FIN 48, supra note 78, T 10.
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Staff Position No. FIN 48-1, Definition of
4 (2007), available at
"Settlement" in FASB Interpretation No. 48
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fsp-fin48-1.pdf (hereinafterFSP FIN 48-1).
104 Id.
105 Cf Id.
5.
102
103

I06 Id. 6.
107 Id. 12.
108 Id.

109FIN 48, supra note 78,
Ilo Id.
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FIN 48 requires a series of disclosures at the end of each annual
reporting period. One of the most controversial of these disclosures is the
required tabular reconciliation of the total amounts of unrecognized tax
benefits at the beginning and end of the period."' This reconciliation must
include the gross amounts of the increases and decreases in unrecognized
tax benefits as a result of tax positions taken during a prior period, the gross
amounts of increases and decreases in unrecognized tax benefits as a result
of tax positions taken during the current period, the amounts of decreases in
the unrecognized tax benefits relating to settlements with taxing authorities,
and the reductions to unrecognized tax benefits as a result of a lapse of the
applicable statute of limitations.112 Also required in the disclosures are the
total amounts of unrecognized tax benefits that, if recognized, would affect
the effective tax rate, the total amounts of interest and penalties recognized
in the statement of operations and the total amounts of interest and penalties
recognized in the statement of financial position, any potential significant
increases or decreases in unrecognized tax benefits, and a description of tax
years that remain subject to examination by major tax jurisdictions." 3
VI. FIN 48'S CREATION OF COMPLEXITY IN THE TRANSFER
PRICING ARENA
One of the principal contentions with FIN 48 and transfer pricing
concerns the evaluation of each tax position without concern to any
aggregation or set-offs.1 4 The regulations under section 482 specifically
allow for aggregation of transactions: "the combined effect of two or more
separate transactions (whether before, during, or after the taxable year under
review) may be considered, if such transactions, taken as a whole, are so
interrelated that consideration of multiple transactions is the most reliable
means of determining the arm's length consideration for the controlled
transactions.""i5 This regulation is in stark contrast to the explicit FIN 48
requirement that positions are to be evaluated without regard to
aggregation. Effectively, the taxpayer is forced to consider a multitude of
transactions at the individual level or, conversely, must reevaluate the unit
of account.
As mentioned above, the regulations also allow set-offs. If a section
482 adjustment is made, the Commissioner will consider other arm's length
transactions, provided that the taxpayer complies with certain guidelines in
the regulations, which will result in a set-off against the original section 482
adjustment."' As with aggregations, FIN 48 conversely requires a position...
Id. 12 1(a).
112 Id

" Id. % 21(b)-(e).

Id. 7(c).
1s Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(f)(2)(i) (2008).
116 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(g)(4)(i) (2008).
114
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by-position analysis.
Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-6 imposes significant penalties on
taxpayers who have a substantial valuation adjustment under the section
482 transfer pricing rules. The penalties range from 20 percent to 40
percent of the underpayment. The regulations do provide an escape route
from such severe penalties. Under the regulations, a taxpayer will not be
assessed a penalty on any portion of the underpayment where the taxpayer
used a "specified method", as defined in the regulations under section 482
for calculating the arm's length7prices, and where the taxpayer met specific
documentation requirements.
Interestingly, the level of confidence
required under the regulations is not as strict as FIN 48's more-likely-thannot standard. The regulations require that the "taxpayer reasonably
concluded that the method (and its application of that method) provided the
most reliable measure of an arm's length result under the principles of the
best method rule" in section 482.118 A reasonable conclusion is met if the
taxpayer made a reasonable effort to evaluate the potential applicability of
the other specified methods.' 19 The regulations provide suggestive criteria
in determining whether a reasonable effort was made.12 0
In addition to having concluded that the method was reasonable, the
taxpayer must also maintain sufficient documentation to establish that the
taxpayer reasonably concluded that the method and its application provided
the most reliable measure of an arm's length result.121 These documents
must be in existence contemporaneously with the filing of the tax return.122
The significance of this anti-penalty provision is that the taxpayer is
relieved of the possibility of having a significant transfer pricing penalty
imposed while, anomalously, still subjecting the taxpayer to the possibility
that the tax position does not exceed the more-likely-than-not threshold of
FIN 48. Thus while no tax-related penalty is imposed, the taxpayer remains
vulnerable to the possibility that its financial statements will be deemed not
in accord with United States GAAP.
These divergent standards create additional work for the tax preparer.
Although the documentation and the relevant analysis may satisfy penalty
provisions, the taxpayer is left in the precarious position of possibly having
to perform more work to assure himself that he has exceeded the morelikely-than-not threshold and the amount of the position that has a greater
than 50 percent cumulative probability of being sustained.12 3 Accordingly,
117
118

Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2) (2008).
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(ii) (2008).

119 Id.
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id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii) (1996).
122 Id.; see also Freeman, supra
note 7.
123 Katherine Treasure, Fin 48: Uncertain Tax Positions Associated
with Transfer
Pricing, Mondaq, Aug. 28, 2007, available at http://webiis06.mondaq.com/unitedstates/
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the taxpayer may have to undertake the arduous task of recomputing the
arm's length prices because what may satisfy the reasonable "best method"
may not necessarily be the only method that should be considered under
FIN 48.124

Even though a multinational enterprise's intercompany transactions
may fall within an arm's length range of results, an uncertain tax position
may still exist. "This may occur where management believes that they may
ultimately settle at some other amount within or outside of the range
documented."l 2 5 Hence the mere satisfaction of an arm's length result does
not necessarily preclude the recognition of FIN 48 liability.
1. Will FIN 48 Create a Road-Map for the I.R.S.?
An area of significant concern is that the FIN 48 disclosures will create
a roadmap for the I.R.S. to audit a taxpayer. FIN 48 mandates that
companies disclose, for each annual reporting period, a tabular
reconciliation of the total amounts of unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) at
the beginning and end of the period, which must include at a minimum
certain specified items. Among the most controversial of these items
required in the tabular reconciliation are the requirements that the company
disclose the amount of current increases or decreases in UTBs resulting
from tax positions taken the current taxable year, the amounts of decreases
in UTBs relating to settlements with taxing authorities, and the reduction
(and consequent recognition) of UTBs relating to a lapse of the applicable
statute of limitations. Taxpayers are concerned that the I.R.S. may identify
audit issues through the company's FIN 48 disclosures. 12 6
Generally an independent auditor supports a client's financial
statements with workpapers. When auditing a client's tax positions, the
independent auditor prepares "tax accrual workpapers" to gain comfort over
the tax positions, uncertain tax positions, and the disclosures reported by the
taxpayer/client on its financial statements. The "tax accrual workpapers
pinpoint the 'soft spots' on a corporation's tax return by highlighting those
areas in which the corporate taxpayer has taken a position that may, at some
later date, require the payment of additional taxes."l 27
In United States v. Arthur Young, the Supreme Court noted that it is

the responsibility of the I.R.S. to determine whether a corporate taxpayer in
completing its return has stretched a particular tax concept beyond what is
allowed.' 2 8 Furthermore, the court noted that records that illuminate aspects
of the return, such as the tax accrual workpapers, are highly relevant to the
article.asp?articleid=51562&pr.
124 id.
125 Id.
126 Dunbar & McEligot, supra note
86, at A-806.
127 United States v. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805,
813 (1984).
128 Id.at 815.
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legitimate I.R.S. inquiry. 129 The court held that tax accrual workpapers
prepared by an independent certified public accountant were not protected
by any work-product doctrine from disclosure to the I.R.S.
Arthur Young raises the concern that an independent certified public
accountant's workpapers prepared to support the FIN 48 items will be
subject to I.R.S. probing and will create a roadmap for the I.R.S. to bring an
action against the taxpayer. This is especially worrisome in the transfer
pricing arena, an area fraught with complexity and ambiguity.
Since Arthur Young, the I.R.S. has exercised a "policy of restraint" on
requesting tax accrual workpapers. However in 2002 the I.R.S. loosened its
policy on self-restraint. In an I.R.S. Announcement, the I.R.S. stated that
they will request the tax accrual workpapers related to certain listed
transactions and to the extent that a taxpayer engaged in certain listed
transactions but did not disclose them, will request all the tax accrual

workpapers. 13 0
Notwithstanding the policy of restraint, the question arises as to
whether or not the I.R.S. will request tax accrual workpapers on behalf of
another country that may be seeking them via a treaty request. For
example, suppose a country requests that the I.R.S. obtain a taxpayer's FIN
48 tax accrual workpapers because the foreign taxing authority believes that
the taxpayer has taken questionable transfer pricing positions. Will the
I.R.S. pierce the policy of restraint in order to appease the concerns of the
foreign taxing authority? Indeed the I.R.S. has admitted that it shares
information it gathers from taxpayers from the APA Program. 13 1
FIN 48 reporting has begun revealing interesting information,
including information related to APAs. FIN 48 transparency requirements
have disclosed that several taxpayers' usage of APAs has allowed them to
reduce tax provisions and recognize significant tax benefits.13 2 For
example, BNA's Daily Tax Report identified Google, Inc. as having
recognized a $90 million tax benefit thanks to an APA for 2003-06.
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Despite its surrounding controversy, FIN 48 creates a standard to
which preparers of U.S. GAAP financial statements must adhere. While
certainly a departure from the desire to move U.S. GAAP towards a
principles-based system, FIN 48 nonetheless puts preparers on parity when
it comes to determining their uncertain tax positions. Transfer pricing,
without a doubt, remains a complex area fraught with subjective
129

id.
130 I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72 (July 8, 2002).
13'IRS Admits to SharingAPA Information with Treaty Partners,2007 TAX NOTES 23-3
(2007).
132 APAs: FIN 48 Reporting Reveals Significant Number of APAs, DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA), Dec. 31, 2008.
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determinations and is often the source of tax adjustments by the relevant
taxing authority. Moreover, in the United States, divergent standards
evolving from the I.R.S. and the FASB have added undue complexity for
preparers of financial statements and tax returns.
When a taxpayer enters into APA negotiations with the I.R.S. and
when they ultimately come to an APA agreement, incorporating a FIN 48
provision under the APA would alleviate some of the complexities and
uncertainties that enshroud transfer pricing and its FIN 48 implications.
Under the FIN 48 provision, the parties would agree that the choice of
transfer pricing methodology will survive the more-likely-than-not
standard. That is, when selecting the "best method" transfer pricing
methodology, the parties will agree that there is a more than fifty percent
likelihood of that position being sustained by the I.R.S. provided that the
taxpayer conforms to the requirements of the APA. Furthermore, in terms
of measurement, when choosing an arm's length range of results, if the
taxpayer satisfies the APA provisions, it may recognize the full benefits
agreed to, provided it falls within the arm's length range of results.
Therefore, compliance with the APA would unequivocally satisfy FIN 48
requirements and not require additional work at the financial statement
level.
The FASB should revise FIN 48 to allow the taxpayer to take transfer
pricing set-offs and aggregations into account when performing the FIN 48
analysis. The disparate treatment between the I.R.S. and FIN 48 creates
added work for the financial statement preparer. Since the taxing authority
finds set-offs and aggregations acceptable, the FASB should also find them
acceptable.
Finally, the APA agreements should be revised and include an
assertion from the I.R.S. that they will not use FIN 48 workpapers and other
tax accrual workpapers as a road map to adjustment. While divesting the
I.R.S. of its ability to request such documents, preparers will be relieved of
the burden and fear that their workpapers and disclosures may lead to
significant adjustments. Assuming that international tax treaties will not be
jeopardized, the I.R.S. should end the practice of disclosing the information
gleaned in the APA process to foreign taxing jurisdictions.
Not only will these changes to the APA process relieve some of the
inherent transfer pricing complexities associated with FIN 48, it will
encourage more taxpayers to engage ex ante in a negotiation process with
the I.R.S. The I.R.S. will also be able to direct its efforts to those
transactions falling outside of Advanced Pricing Agreements. These
proposals also further the cooperative nature of the APA program.
Additionally, FIN 48's objective of consistent treatment and measurement
of uncertain tax benefits will not be compromised. In fact, by directly
working with the taxing authority, many uncertainties which are the object
of FIN 48 will become clarified.
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